The Battle of Kolin was a battle fought on June 18, 1757 during the Seven Years' War.

A Prussian army of 32,000 men fought an Austrian army under Daun of 44,000 men. The Prussians lost the battle and nearly 14,000 men, the Austrians lost 9,000 men.

Friedrich II had won a battle against Austria and was now sieging Prague. Marshal Daun had been too late to participate in the battle of Prague, but picked up 16,000 men who had escaped from the battle. With this army he slowly moved to relieve Prague and the Prussian forces had to be split.

Friedrich took 32,000 of his men to intercept Daun. Knowing that the Prussian forces were too weak to both siege Prague and keep Daun away from Prague for a longer time (or to fight the Austrian army reinforced by the Prague garrison), the Austrian took defensive positions on hills near Kolin. So Friedrich was forced to attack the numerically stronger opponent. Reports of the Austrian strengths are mixed: some report 44,000 men, some reports mention 65,000 men. The battlefield of Kolin consisted of gently rolling hill slopes.

Friedrich's plan was to envelop the Austrian right wing with most of his army (of course off range of the Austrian weapons). Along the Austrian lines (Prussian right wing and center) there were only enough Prussian troops to be kept to hide the concentration on the Prussian left wing.

The Prussian main force was to turn right toward the Austrians in order to attack their right flank. In the strong Prussian left wing the Prussians would even outnumber the Austrians. After the Austrian right wing had been defeated the battle would be decided.

Unfortunately for Friedrich his main force turned toward the Austrians too early and attacked their defensive positions frontally instead of outflanking them. Austrian light infantry (Croats) seem to have played an important role in this; harassing the regular Prussian infantry under Generals von Manstein and Tresckow, they provoked them into a premature attack.

Now the disunited Prussian columns all blundered into a series of uncoordinated attacks, each against superior numbers. By the afternoon, after about five hours of fighting, Daun's troops were pinching the disoriented Prussians, and driving them back.

Prussian cuirassiers under Oberst von Seydlitz (promoted to major-general on that day) finally showed up. The Krzeczor Hill was the location of numerous charges and countercharges. The first Guard battalion under General von Tauentzien saved the Prussian army from a worse fate, covering the Prussian retreat.

The battle was Frederick's first defeat in this war. This disaster forced him to abandon his intended march on Wien, and entailed raising the siege of Prague, and the Prussians fell back on Leitmeritz. The Austrians, reinforced by the 48,000 troops in Prague, followed them, 100,000 strong, and, falling on Prince August Wilhelm of Prussia, who was retreating eccentrically (for commissariat reasons) on Zittau, inflicted a severe check upon him. The king was compelled to abandon Bohemia.

Frederick blamed his defeat on his generals, such as Prince Moritz von Anhalt-Dessau. The truth is more subtle. The greatest blame must be laid in Frederick himself. He opted for an assault against a numerically superior opponent. He chose a risky strategy for the battle. An often underestimated factor in the battle was the tenacious and skillful defense organized by the Austrian marshal Daun. In other battles Fredrick opted for the same flanking strategy, and won brilliant victories. The Austrian army under Daun not only withstood the Prussian assaults but also selected the correct momentum for a careful counter-attack.