The battle of Scarrifholis was fought in Donegal in north-western Ireland, on the 21st of June 1650, during the Irish Confederate Wars – part of the Wars of the Three Kingdoms. It was fought between the Irish Catholic Ulster Army, commanded by Heber MacMahon, Bishop of Clogher and an English Parliamentarian army commanded by Charles Coote and composed of troops from the New Model Army and local British Protestant settlers. The battle resulted in the annihilation of the Irish army and the loss of most of its weapons and supplies. This secured the north of Ireland for the English Parliament and contributed greatly to the Cromwellian conquest of Ireland.

Background

The Irish Ulster Army was raised by the Irish Confederate Catholics in 1642 to organise the insurgent forces who were operating there since the rebellion of the previous year. Up to 1649, it was commanded by Owen Roe O'Neill, a professional soldier who had served in the Spanish army. However, O’Neill died in late 1649 and was replaced by a Catholic Bishop, Heber MacMahon of Clogher. MacMahon had no real military experience, but was elected by the Ulster officers to avoid political infighting among their officers. The army was split between those who supported the Confederate's treaty with the English Royalists, mainly pre-war land-owners such as Phelim O'Neill and the army's professional officers and Catholic clergy which did not. Before his death, Owen Roe O'Neill had left the Confederation and only re-joined it after the invasion of Ireland by Oliver Cromwell in 1649.

On the other side, the leadership of the British Protestant forces in Ulster had been taken over from the Scottish Covenanters and the Royalist aligned British settlers by English Parliamentarians. These comprised of settlers like Charles Coote and a Parliamentary army sent to the northern Irish province by Oliver Cromwell in 1649 commanded by Robert Venables and Theophilus Jones. The Scots and Royalists in the province had besieged Coote at Derry, but were routed by Venables at the battle of Lisnagarvey in Antrim. After this point, the Parliamentarians assumed command of the war against the Ulster army.

The campaign

MacMahon assembled the Ulster army in Loughall in south Armagh, with 4000 infantry and 600 cavalry. They were, however short of ammunition and over half of their men carried pikes rather than muskets (whereas the norm at the time was one pike for two muskets). His aim was to march through the centre of Ulster and drive a wedge between Coote’s garrison at Derry in the west of province and Venables’ command at Carrickfergus in the east. With the Parliamentarian troops tied down by the activities of Irish guerrillas or "tories", the Ulster army marched up to Ballycastle on the northern coast of Ulster and left a string of garrisons along the centre of the province. They then marched west, towards Coote’s army , which was in Lifford, near Derry. Fending off an attack by the English cavalry as they crossed the river Finn, the Irish encamped on a mountain side at Scarrifholis, south of Letterkenny along the road to Donegal town and near the river Swilly. The local Protestant population fled to the fortified towns in the area, as the war in Ulster had, from its outset, been characterised by atrocities committed against civilians by both sides. Meanwhile, Parliamentarian reinforcements had joined Coote from eastern Ulster, bringing his forces up to 3000 men, compared to 4000 Irish. However, the British force had more ammunition and more cavalry than their enemies. MacMahon’s officers warned him not to leave their strong defensive position and risk battle, as the Parliamentary army was tactically superior to them. Rather, they should stay put and wait for the enemy to disperse when their supplies ran out, leaving the Irish free to march back to their stronghold along the border with Leinster. MacMahon however refused to listen to military advice and ordered his troops down from their mountain camp to give battle to the Parliamentary army.

The Battle

MacMahon’s inexperience was further exposed in how he drew up his troops for battle. He placed a small advance guard in front his army and positioned the rest of his troops in a huge solid mass, which meant that it would be very difficult to manoeuvre and very few units could actually engage the enemy, being stuck within the ranks of their own men. Coote, meanwhile, who had been fighting since 1641 and whose father had been a professional soldier, drew up his men in small flexible units – able to reinforce one another and to move around the battlefield.

The battle started when Coote sent an infantry detachment to meet the Irish advance party. The two sides exchanged musket volleys at close range and then fought hand to hand with pikes and musket butts. However, Coote steadily reinforced his infantry and eventually drove the Irishmen back into the front of their formation. Because of the formation MacMahon had adopted, this virtually imprisoned the front ranks of the Irish army, who were trapped behind their own panicked skirmishers and the pursuing British infantry. Seeing his chance, Coote sent more infantry to attack the flanks of the Irish formation, trapping the whole force between his men and the mountain side that they had marched down from before the battle.

The predicament the Irish now found themselves in was a little like the Roman army that Hannibal destroyed at battle of Cannae in 212 BC. Although they still outnumbered their enemies, they were pinned in dense uncoordinated mass, unable to defend themselves against the troops who had surrounded them. Increasingly, they were a mob of terrified individuals rather than a disciplined military unit. The fact they were also very short of ammunition meant that the Parliamentarians were able to pour volleys into this dense mass without effective reply, cutting down the Irish from a distance. At this point, the Irish were routed, and their leaders and horsemen fled the battlefield, pursued by the Parliamentarian cavalry and by the local Protestant population –taking the opportunity to avenge the massacres they had suffered in 1641-42. Nevertheless, the doomed Irish infantry fought doggedly until they were slaughtered. Testament to this is that two thirds of the Irish dead were found on the battlefield itself rather than along the line of pursuit.

The battle was a decisive victory for Coote and British Parliamentarians. Over 3000 of the Ulster army were killed – 2000 on the field and another 1000 in the pursuit – about 75% of their total numbers. The Parliamentarians lost only around 100 soldiers killed. Coote ordered that Irish wounded and prisoners taken were to be killed, including Henry O’Neill, Owen Roe’s son, who had surrendered on terms. MacMahon was captured a week later at Enniskillen and hanged.

The battle marked the destruction of the Ulster army, not only because of the loss of manpower, which could be replaced, but because of the loss of many officers and virtually all their weapons and equipment, which could not. In addition to O’Neill and MacMahon, the Irish lost 9 colonels, 4 lieutenant colonels, 3 majors, 20 captains and hundreds of other junior officers. This represented a huge cull of the Ulster Irish Catholic land-owning class, far bigger than in the famous Flight of the Earls in 1603. For this reason, the battle has been described as Ulster’s Aughrim – a battle marking the extermination of the province’s native aristocracy and assuring the continued existence and supremacy of its Protestant settler population.

Coote went on to march south, taking Sligo and then Galway after a long siege in 1652. The surrender of this city marked the effective end of the Irish resistance to the Cromwellian conquest of Ireland.

Sources

• James Scott Wheeler, Cromwell in Ireland, Dublin 1999
• Eamonn O Ciardha, Ireland and the Jacobite Cause, Dublin 2002
• Padraig Lenihan, Confederate Catholics at War , Cork 2000.