Bernard Gert (born October 16, 1934 in Cincinnati, Ohio) is a philosopher of ethics known primarily for his work on medical ethics, especially pertaining to psychology, and for his emphasis on the importance of avoiding evil as opposed to promoting good. Gert studied philosophy at Cornell University and is presently the Stone Professor of Intellectual and Moral Philosophy at Dartmouth College.

The Importance of Evil

Gert believes evil is that which all rational creatures seek to avoid, namely, death and suffering. He maintains that the worst evils are far more important in terms of their effects than the greatest goods, and that it is therefore appropriate for morality to emphasize the avoidance of evil.

Rationality and Impartiality

To understand Gert's philosophy, it is important to understand the role rationality plays. According to Gert, rationality does not require morality, however, it does require that we avoid harming ourselves without a reason. Therefore, a rational person would not cause his own pain unless it were for a reason, for example, to cure a disease. Even a masochist causes pain for a reason, presumably for pleasure. Thus, no rational being seeks to harm himself for its own sake.

Certain things represent objects of irrational desire, for example, death, pain, and disability. We arrive at moral rules by extending these objects of irrational desire to others. Rationality, alone, does not require this. However, if we adopt the princple of impartiality, whereby we apply the rules without regard to who gains or loses, we extend these prohibitions to others. This results in rules such as do not kill, do not cause pain, do not disable, and so forth.

Publicity

Gert does not maintain that the moral rules we derive from combining our rational prohibitions and the principle of impartiality are inviolate. In fact, there are sometimes good reasons for violating them. For example, it might well be necessary to cause another pain in order to prevent him from killing someone else. The key to being able to violate a moral rule is that we must be willing to publicly allow and advocate the exception to the rule.

Critics of the publicity requirement state that people are willing to advocate illogical and counterfactual things. For example, Michael E. Berumen agrees with Gert's methods for developing moral rules, but he believes that universalization in conformance with logic is a more legitimate means of justifying exceptions.

Sources

By Bernard Gert

• The Moral Rules: A New Rational Foundation for Morality, Harper and Row, 1970.
• Morality: A New Justification of the Moral Rules, Oxford University Press, 1988.
• Morality: Its Nature and Justification, Oxford University Press, 1998.
• Common Morality: Deciding What to Do, Oxford University Press, 2004.

Other References

• Do No Evil: Ethics with Applications to Economic Theory and Business, by Michael E. Berumen, iUniverse, 2003.

External link

• Gert's homepage at Dartmouth