This article, part of the History of Chile series, covers the period of the presidency of Salvador Allende.

Salvador Allende was president of Chile from 1970 until 1973. His Popular Unity government was the only freely elected Marxist national government in history; it was when he was overthrown in a military coup d'état (see Chilean coup of 1973), during which Allende died.

Allende becomes president

Main article: 1970 Chilean presidential election

In the 1970 election, Allende, running with the Unidad Popular (UP or Popular Unity) coalition, received a plurality with 36.3% of the vote. Christian Democrat Radomiro Tomic won 27.9% with a very similar platform to Allende's. Conservative former president Jorge Alessandri received slightly under 35.8% of the vote.

According to the constitution, Congress had to decide between the two candidates who had received the most votes. The precedent set on the three previous occasions this situation had arisen since 1932 was for Congress simply to choose the candidate with the largest number of votes; indeed, former president Alessandri had been elected in 1958 with 31.6% of the popular vote.

In this case, however, there was an active campaign against Allende's confirmation by Congress, and his presidency was ratified only after he signed a "Statute of Constitutional Guarantees".

It has been argued than given that less than the majority of the voters voted for him, Allende did not have a clear "mandate" to embark in the wide reforms put forward on his program. But the legality of the election itself is not in dispute.

"The Chilean Way to Socialism"

In office, Allende pursued a policy he called "La vía chilena al socialismo" ("The Chilean Way to Socialism"). This included nationalization of certain large-scale industries (notably copper), reform of the health care system, a continuation of his predecessor Eduardo Frei Montalva's reforms of the educational system, a program of free milk for children, and an attempt at agrarian reform. [1]. The previous government of Eduardo Frei has already partly nationalised copper by acquiring a 51 percent share in foreign owned mines. Allende expropriated the remaining percentage without compensating the U.S. companies that owned the mines.

Chilean presidents were allowed a maximum of 6 years, which may explain Allende's haste to restructure the economy. Not only did he have a significant restructuring program organised, it had to be a success if a successor to Allende was going to be elected.

The government's efforts to pursue these reforms led to strong opposition by landowners, some middle-class sectors, the rightist National Party, the Roman Catholic Church (which was displeased with the direction of the educational reforms [2]), and eventually the Christian Democrats.

The land reforms that Allende highlighted as one of the central policies of his government had already begun under his predecessor Eduardo Frei Montalva, who had expropriated between one-fifth and one-quarter of all properties liable to takeover [Collier & Sater, 1996]. The Allende government's intention was to seize all holdings of more than eighty basic irrigated hectares [Faundez, 1988]. Allende also intended to improve the socio-economic welfare of Chile's poorest citizens. A key element was to provide employment, either in the new nationalised enterprises or on public works projects.

Towards the end of 1971, Fidel Castro toured Chile extensively during a four-week visit. [3] This gave credence to the belief of those on the right that "The Chilean Way to Socialism" was an effort to put Chile on the same path as Cuba.

Economics

In the first year of Allende's term, the short-term economic results of Minister of the Economics Pedro Vuskovic 's expansive monetary policy were unambiguously favorable: 12% industrial growth and an 8.6% increase in GDP, accompanied by major declines in inflation (down from 34.9% to 22.1%) and unemployment (down to 3.8%). However, these results were not sustained and in 1972 the Chilean escudo had runaway inflation of 140%. The combination of inflation and government-mandated price-fixing led to the rise of black markets in rice, beans, sugar, and flour, and a "disappearance" of such basic commodities from supermarket shelves. [4]

October 1972 saw the first of what were to be a wave of confrontational strikes by some of the historically well-off sectors of Chilean society. A strike by owners of trucks was joined by small businesmen, some (mostly professional) unions, and some student groups. Other than the inevitable damage to the economy, the chief effect of the 24-day strike was to bring the head of the army, general Carlos Prats, into the government as Interior Minister. [5]

In addition to the earlier-discussed provision of employment, Allende also raised wages on a number of occasions throughout 1970 and 1971. These rises in wages were negated by continuing increases in prices for food. Although price rises had also been high under Frei (27% a year between 1967 and 1970), a basic basket of consumer goods rose by 120% from 190 to 421 escudos in one month alone, August 1972. In the period 1970-72, while Allende was in government, exports fell 24% and imports rose 26%, with imports of food rising an estimated 149% [figures are from Nove, 1986, pp. 4-12, tables 1.1 & 1.7]. Although nominal wages were rising, there was not a comensurate increase in the standard of living for the Chilean population.

The falls in exports were mostly due to a fall in the price of copper. Chile was at the mercy of international fluctuations in the value of its single most important export. As with almost half of developing countries, more than 50 per cent of Chile's export receipts were from a single primary commodity [Hoogvelt, 1997]. Adverse fluctuation in the international price of copper negatively affected the Chilean economy throughout 1971-2. The price of copper fell from a peak of $66 per ton in 1970 to only $48-9 in 1971 and 1972 [Nove, 1986]. This fall in the value of copper would combine with a lack of economic aid to bring about the economic conditions that led to events later in 1973.

Despite declining economic indicators, Allende's Popular Unity coalition actually slightly increased its vote to 43 percent in the parliamentary elections early in 1973. However, by this point what had started as an informal alliance with the Christian Democrats [6] was anything but: the Christian Democrats now leagued with the right-wing National Party to oppose Allende's government, the two parties calling themselves the Confederación Democrática (CODE). The conflict between the executive and legislature paralyzed initiatives from either side. [7]

Crisis

On June 29, 1973, a tank regiment under the command of Colonel Roberto Souper surrounded the presidential palace (la Moneda) in a violent but unsuccessful coup attempt. [8] That failed coup was followed by a further strike at the end of July, joined this time by the copper miners of El Teniente as well. On August 9, General Prats was made Minister of Defense, but this decision proved so unpopular with the military that on August 22 he was forced to resign not only this position but his role as Commander-in-Chief of the Army; he was replaced in the latter role by Pinochet. [9]

For some months now, the government had been afraid to call upon the national police known as the carabineros, for fear of their lack of loyalty. In August 1973, a constitutional crisis was clearly in the offing: the Supreme Court publicly complained about the government's inability to enforce the law of the land and on August 22 the Chamber of Deputies (with the Christian Democrats now firmly uniting with the National Party) accused Allende's government of unconstitutional acts and called on the military ministers to assure the constitutional order. [10]

In early September 1973, Allende floated the idea of resolving the crisis with a plebiscite.

Coup

Main article: 1973 coup in Chile

As mentioned above, on August 22, 1973 the Christian Democrats and the National Party members of the Chamber of Deputies called on the military to "put an immediate end" to what they described as "breach[es of] the Constitution... with the goal of redirecting government activity toward the path of Law and ensuring the constitutional order of our Nation and the essential underpinnings of democratic coexistence among Chileans." (See 1973 coup in Chile; text of the resolution is at [11].)

After a long list of grievances, Allende's government was accused of a "breakdown of the Rule of Law by means of the creation and development of government-protected armed groups which... are headed towards a confrontation with the Armed Forces." Allende's efforts to re-organize the military and police (which he clearly had reason to fear in their then-current forms) were characterized as "notorious attempts to use the Armed and Police Forces for partisan ends, destroy their institutional hierarchy, and politically infiltrate their ranks."

Two days later (August 24, 1973), Allende responded (See 1973 coup in Chile; full text of the response is at [12] in Spanish, [13] in English), responding point-by point to their accusations and, in turn, accusing Congress of "facilit[ing] the seditious intention of certain sectors" and promoting a coup or a civil war by "invoking the intervention of the Armed Forces and of Order against a democratically elected government". He pointed out that the declaration had failed to obtain the required two-thirds majority constitutionally required to bring an accusation against the president and argued that the legislature was trying to usurp the executive role.

"Chilean democracy," he wrote, "is a conquest by all of the people. It is neither the work nor the gift of the exploiting classes, and it will be defended by those who, with sacrifices accumulated over generations, have imposed it... With a tranquil conscience... I sustain that never before has Chile had a more democratic government than that over which I have the honor to preside." He concluded by calling upon "the workers, all democrats and patriots" to join him in defense of the constitution and of the "revolutionary process."

Pinochet and Allende in 1973

Allende was overthrown by a military coup d'état on September 11, 1973, in which rebels bombed the Presidential Palace with British-made Hawker Hunter fighter jets. During this coup, Allende died. The nature of his death is unclear: Statements given by two doctors from the La Moneda Palace infirmary: Patricio Guijón, who made a statement at the time, and José Quiroga who confirmed it many years later, says that he committed suicide with a machine gun, and an autopsy labelled his death as suicide, while others insist that while defending the palace he was murdered by the military forces of Augusto Pinochet, who the coup brought to power. [14], [15], [16]

U.S. role in opposing Allende

See main article U.S. intervention in Chile.

While U.S. government hostility to the Allende regime is unquestioned, the U.S. role in the coup itself remains a highly controversial matter. Documents declassified during the Clinton administration [17] show that the United States government and the CIA had sought the overthrow of Allende in 1970, immediately after he took office ("Project FUBELT "; U.S. efforts to prevent Allende taking office in 1970 are discussed in 1970 Chilean presidential election), but claims of their direct involvement in the actual coup are neither proven nor contradicted by publicly available documentary evidence; many potentially relevant documents still remain classified. [18]

Clandestine efforts by the U.S. government to prevent Allende from taking office are particularly well documented. For example, a formal instruction was issued on 16 October 1970 to the CIA base in Chile, saying in part, "It is firm and continuing policy that Allende be overthrown by a coup. It would be much preferable to have this transpire prior to 24 October but efforts in this regard will continue vigorously beyond this date. We are to continue to generate maximum pressure toward this end, utilizing every appropriate resource. It is imperative that these actions be implemented clandestinely and securely so that the USG and American hand be well hidden..." [19]

An early documented action in this regard was the kidnapping of René Schneider by an anti-Allende group. Schneider was an army commander and a constitutionalist, which meant he would not support a coup. The CIA in Santiago kept contact with two groups inside the military and provided guns and money for this action. However, Schneider was killed during the operation. This incident caused the citizens and the military to rally behind the just-elected Allende.

Immediately after the Allende government won office the U.S. began high-level planning to ensure the Marxist experiment would not succeed. This would be achieved by, among other strategies, massive reduction in economic aid. Declassified U.S. National Security Council documents, include decision memorandum no. 93, dated November 9, 1970, written by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and addressed to the heads of diplomatic, defense and intelligence departments. This document stated that pressure should be placed on the Allende government to prevent its consolidation and limit its ability to implement policies contrary to U.S. and hemisphere interests, specifically, the President has directed no new bilateral economic aid commitments be undertaken with the government of Chile [Kissinger, 1970].

The CIA was notified by contacts of the impending Pinochet coup two days in advance, but contends it "played no direct role in" the coup. After Pinochet assumed power, U.S. Secretary of State Kissinger told U.S. President Richard Nixon that the U.S. "didn't do it" (referring to the coup itself) but had "created the conditions as great [sic] as possible." [20]

Articles about Allende/Pinochet coup d'état in Chile

• History of Chile - long article with section on 1970-1973 events
• 1970 Chilean presidential election
• 1973 coup in Chile
• Salvador Allende - deposed by 1973 coup
• Augusto Pinochet - took power in 1973 coup
• Chile under Pinochet - aftermath of the coup
• U.S. intervention in Chile

External links

• An extensive Spanish-language site providing a day-by-day chronology of the Allende era. This is clearly a partisan, pro-Allende source, but the research and detail are enormous.
• The August 22, 1973 document under which the Chamber of Deputies called on the military to overthrow the Allende regime. This is a solid translation of the document, although the introductory note is clearly that of an apologist for the coup.
• Allende's August 24, 1973 response
• National Security Archive's Chile Documentation Project which provides documents obtained from FOIA requests regarding U.S. involvement in Chile, beginning with attempts to promote a coup in 1970 and continuing through U.S. support for Pinochet
• Allende first speech to Chilean parliament following the 1970 election

References

• Simon Collier & William F. Sater (1996). A History of Chile: 1808-1994. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

• Julio Faundez (1988). Marxism and democracy in Chile: From 1932 to the fall of Allende, New Haven: Yale University Press.

• Anke Hoogvelt (1997). Globalisation and the postcolonial world, London: Macmillan.

• Henry Kissinger (1970). National Security Decision 93: Policy Towards Chile, Washington: National Security Council.

• Alec Nove (1986). Socialism, Economics and Development, London: Allen & Unwin.